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Consensual Uncertainty ^
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University of California, Los Angeles
"There are uncertainities, and there are un-
certainities."
—Raiffa
Although every organization routinizes
many decisions, there remain those perplexing
problems, complicated by many internal and ex-
ternal factors, for which it is difficult to distin-
guish appropriate action. A vexing attribute of
the situations surrounding many of these prob-
lems is their "uncertainty," and many research-
ers have focused specifically on the impact of
uncertainty in organizations.
Those interested in complex organization
settings have tended to move away from notions
of uncertainty that focus only on the predicta-
bility of specific outcomes (8, 6) and toward def-
initions which focus on ongoing processes. Law-
rence and Lorsch (5), for example, tie uncertain-
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ty to three factors: clarity of information, relia-
bility of causal relationships, and time span of
definitive feedback with relation to outcomes.
Duncan (3) suggests that the number and simi-
larity of factors considered in a decision and the
extent and frequency of change in factors con-
sidered contribute to uncertainty. Perrow (7)
focuses on the frequency with which the rou-
tine of the organization is disrupted and the ex-
tent of search for alternatives when disruptions
occur as indicators of relative uncertainty in or-
ganizational technology.
These influential studies have in common
an attempt to isolate "contextual" factors caus-
ing uncertainty for the organization. They use
combinatorial ratJngs from organization mem-
bers and/or secondary indicators of variance
(e.g. fluctuating prices) to measure relative un-
certainty in specific settings. Although the spe-
cific relationships presented by Duncan and
1 James Huff and Meryl Louis made helpful comments dur-
ing the development of this paper.
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Lawrence and Lorsch have been challenged re-
cently (1, 2, 11), clarity and availability of infor-
mation, stability of relationships, complexity,
and disruption of organizational technology ap-
pear to be critical aspects of the decision con-
text which will continue to be important to stud-
ies of uncertainty.
Another aspect of uncertainty has received
much less attention. This aspect focuses not on
the decision making context itself, but on the
uniformity (consensus) among respondents to
the context. Uniformity in interpretation of a
context is, in general, an aid to the decision-
maker, since information gathered from expe-
riences of others provides a consistent, interpre-
table picture to augment directly available evi-
dence. Lack of consensus among others add to
the uncertainty surrounding a decision situation,
although it may also provide a useful flag to risk-
ier, more controversial decisions.
A Definition of Consensual Uncertainty
Consensual uncertainty is variance, or lack
of consensus, among two or more observers of
a decision context. The measure is relative, since
some difference between observers is always ex-
pected. The greater the divergence (which may
be measured among the same group over time,
among different groups in the same situation, or
among individuals or groups in different situa-
tions), the greater is the consensual uncertainty.
Consensual uncertainty may be thought of
in part as a measure of learning among a group
of individuals. I am indebted to Richard O. Ma-
son for pointing out this aspect of uncertainty in
response to an earlier paper. One would expect
higher consensual uncertainty in newer indus-
tries than in older industries, for example. Con-
sensual uncertainty is also likely to be high fol-
lowing crisis, or in periods of rapid personnel
turnover. In these cases, greater consensus may
come with shared experience in the decision
context.
In other cases, consensual uncertainty may
be a more permanent reflection of varied expe-
rience, thus more directly tied to contextual un-
certainty. Loosely coupled systems appear to be t
prone to consensual uncertainty, since they al-
low varied environmental impact and individual
response to the environment (12). Other settings
characterized by divergent backgrounds and
goals of participants should also be expected to
be characterized by high consensual uncertainty.
The notion of looking for variance among
respondents to a context as a separate type of
uncertainty is important because it highlights a
gap in research on uncertainty. Traditional meth-
odology requires reliability, or low variance
among observers, to report findings with confi-
dence. Most research on uncertain environ-
ments tended to look for cases in which high en-
vironmental uncertainty is consistently ascribed
to the setting studied. This note argues that the
study of uncertainty should give special atten-
tion to situations in which a broad spectrum of
opinion exists about the nature of the environ-
ment. The most uncertain circumstances appear
by definition to be those which cannot with con-
fidence even be said to be uncertain.
An example of the distinctions made possi-
ble by the isolation of consensual uncertainty
may further define the concept (Steiner, 9). Con-
sider a "hypothetical research project which asks
a group of observers (participants or third party
judges) to list and indicate the relative impor-
tance of factors influencing success in different
industries. Industry A, which involves a large and
complex number of factors might b^ tentatively
identified as an industry in which contextual un-
certainty is likely to be high. A second industry,
B, although apparently requiring attention to
fewer key factors, may be found to be more con-
sensually uncertain than Industry A if a less con-
sistent pattern of factors is chosen by observers.
The most uncertain environment faces Industry
C which involves a large number of factors re-
ported in conflicting patterns.
In addition to providing a way of thus dis-
tinguishing industry settings, the idea of consen-J
sual uncertainty may also highlight individual
factors as the subject of consensual uncertainty.
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In the hypothetical sludy just described, consen-
sual uncertainty is likely to be limited to a subset
of factors within each industry. Across industries,
some factors may be also widely recognized as
important, while others are the subject of con-
siderable consensual uncertainty.
Strategic Action When Uncertain
of Uncertainty
The concept of consensual uncertainty iden-
tifies a class of cases in which purposeful action is
very difficult to achieve. At both ends of the
spectrum of what is conventionally called un-
certainty, considerable attention has been given
to prescriptive advice. If conditions are relatively
certain, one sets out to learn about the environ-
ment and develop appropriate rules of behavior.
The process is a reiterative one of trial and error
which gradually approximates desired results.
For conditions at the other end of the spectrum
where prediction is impossible, we are also de-
veloping notions of appropriate behavior. Or-
ganizational tasks and structures should be dif-
ferentiated, flexible, and diverse. Decision styles
should be responsive to new information, rather
than tied to past performance, and contingent,
rather than binding. The process is one of "trial
and trial" in which rules are not sought.
But what is the appropriate behavior if one
does not have a clear picture of the nature of the
environment? On the one hand, " lawful" rela-
tionships sometimes appear to hold, and certain
observers report satisfying results by following
structured rules of action. On the other hand,
anomalous information is also received. Some
observers declare that it is impossible to inter-
pret the decision context even while others
claim they have done so. These reports are as
much data about the world as are observations
of technologic processes or patterns of con-
sumer purchases. They are particularly influen-
tial in that they are likely to be couched more di-
t* rectly in terms of action alternatives.
An individual strategist may or may not re-
flect the consensual uncertainty ascribed to the
larger group. One would expect a review of re-
sponses to reveal a spectrum of action decisions.
This is a complication of the uncertain environ-
ment as it is usually understood. Those adopting
strategies based on stable perspectives of the en-
vironment are likely to appear non-responsive
to what others see as varying conditions. The re-
ciprocal view is that strategies based on uncer-
tainty yield erratic responses to the "same" stim-
ulus. In either case, the strategy chosen may be
based on a confidently-held view of the environ-
ment or may represent a deliberate simplifica-
tion of perception in order to act.
The only strategic response which directly
reflects the consensual uncertainty of the envi-
ronment appears to be a mixed strategy based
on incommensurate assumptions about the en-
vironment. The decision maker takes the agnos-
tic position that various interpretations of the en-
vironment may be simultaneously useful. With-
in the limits of capacity, different decisions are
made which reflect the range of consensual un-
certainty.
This appears to be the "best" strategy since
it most closely matches available information
about the environment. Clearly it is not a stable
perspective. Multinational and diversified firms
often appear to follow this strategy in aggregate.
At the level of the individual decision maker,
the U.S. President perhaps comes close to fol-
lowing a mixed strategy in an environment
which certainly can be described as consensually
uncertain.
Research Implications
observation of contextual and consensual
measures of uncertainty in the same setting may
suggest interesting interactions between these
related phenomenon. It might be hypothesized
that variance in consensual uncertainty will in
general mirror changes in contextual measures
but will lag to account for attention and process-
ing time. Alternatively, high consensual uncer-
tainty may reinforce diversity of action and in-
crease contextual uncertainty over time. Re-
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search is needed to clarify the ways by which
these two measures of uncertainty affect each
other and would seem to be particularly impor-
tant in cases in which the two types of uncertain-
ty do not operate in tandem.
It may also be helpful to further refine the
notion of consensual uncertainty. Consensual
uncertainty can be ascribed not only to descrip-
tion ("what is"), but also to prediction ("what
will be"), evaluation ("what is a desired state"),
and prescription ("how to achieve desired
states"). Differences in levels of consensual un-
certainty in these areas are likely. For example,
influential leadership may be evidenced in little
consensual uncertainty about how to achieve de-
sired results, despite a wide variance in descrip-
tions of present conditions. Alternatively, many
leaders have found that despite widespread
agreement about present conditions, high con-
sensual uncertainty exists when prescriptive or
evaluative judgments are made.
Finer distinctions of uncertain decision en-
vironments can be drawn by profiling contextual
measures of uncertainty (stability of relation-
ships, information availability, etc.) with various
types of consensual uncertainty. Different re-
search questions (and findings) are likely in the
contextually uncertain environment in which
variance among respondents has primarily to do
with prediction compared with the environment
in which contextual uncertainty involves evalua-
tive judgments about desirable outcomes.
The question is not to document the exist-
ence (or resolution) of differences of opinion,
which are already the subject of considerable re-
search, but to look at differences in opinion as M
they cause uncertainty in understanding. Uncer-
tainty arises not because different opinions ex- >
ist, but because the differences offer conflicting
data for making judgments about the nature of
the environment. Perhaps the most important
questions for further research involve responses ,
to this type of uncertainty. Specifically, do strat-
egies exist in which individuals operate without *
simple cognitive consistency in response to con-
sensually uncertain environments? If so, can this
posture be maintained for any length of time, or
does it resolve into decision strategies that pay
less attention to conflicting judgments of others?
Conclusion
The primary value of the concept of consen-
sual uncertainty is to shift attention from vari-
ance in the setting to variance in those who per-
ceive the setting. The more one takes seriously
the notions of relative definitions of reality, indi-
vidual values and experiential learning, the more
important it is to look at the respondent to un-
certain environments. What is certain to one
person is not certain to another. What seems un-
clear at one point in time suddenly becomes
clear and vice versa. These perceptions are
shared in natural settings and help create ongo-
ing change in conditions and interpretations. As
factors affecting certainty, they should be in-
eluded in research as well.
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Determinants of Expatriate Effectiveness:
A Theoretical and Empirical Vacuum^
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The international business environment is
becoming an increasingly important dimension
in the operation of many U.S. corporations. As
U.S, firms expand into international markets,
they encounter the problem of staffing and
maintaining foreign operations with competent
managers. Unfortunately, these problems are
lessened only marginally by seeking cues on
managerial selection and retention from exist-
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ing empirical research, since the literature on
determinants of effectiveness for American ex-
patriate managers is essentially repetitive and
anecdotal in nature. Without a theoretical foun-
dation or empirical direction, this problem will
continue to persist. This note identifies some
crucial directions for expatriate research. Our
recommendations are guided by two assump-
tions: (a) In many respects, the determinants of
effectiveness for expatriates and their domestic
counterparts overlap considerably. Consequent-
ly, this note focuses on only those factors which
are either unique to foreign subsidiaries or are
relatively more important determinants of effec-
tiveness than in domestic operations, (b) We
1 This Conceptual Note is a substantially revised version of a
paper which appeared in the Academy of Management Pro-
ceedings, August, 1976,

